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4 May 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Subject: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 0930 today in Mr. Block's office with the following members present:

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| Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block | - State Department |
| Comdr. David Knoll | - Navy Department |
| Col. Clyde Rich | - Air Force |
| Col. William McNamee | - Army Department |
| | - CIA |

2. With the zest and vitality of today's meeting one would never suspect that the Subcommittee has been such a non-productive unit. It is most significant that the chairman talks plenty but has very little controlling influence upon the direction in which the talk goes, and has, accordingly, proved himself very ineffective in utilising the ability and capacity of the Subcommittee members to produce worthwhile contributions in the field of psychological warfare.

3. At the outset, Mr. Block suggested that three points be added to the agendum of the Subcommittee:

- a. Relation of psychological warfare to censorship.
- b. Relation of psychological warfare to civilian defense.
- c. Development of technical devices.

He stated that he would like to have these items included in the Subcommittee agendum since he himself was desirous of working up papers on two of the three subjects. He did not specifically indicate which two he had in mind. The presumption is that he referred to a and b. After some debate among the service members of the Subcommittee as to the advisability of including these items in the agendum, I suggested to the chairman that he was free to go ahead and prepare papers on any subjects he desired without authority from the Subcommittee members and without the inclusion of the items in the Subcommittee agendum. When the papers were completed he was free to present them to the Subcommittee if he so desired. Mr. Block agreed to follow this pattern of action.

4. Mr. Block stated that he was going to invite [redacted] [redacted] who worked with OSS, to speak to the Subcommittee on training curricula.

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5. Mr. Block stated that Mr. Allen, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, asked questions pertaining to psychological warfare. Mr. Allen had asked Mr. Block for various definitions and the differences between psychological warfare and political warfare. The differences which Mr. Block attempted to make between these two categories sounded like the variance between "snowy" white and "lily" white.

6. Then came the piece de resistance for the day. Commander Knoll said the question had been raised as to what kind of an organization had been recommended by this Subcommittee under 304/6. The statement ast under Block. Knoll stated that the Navy people who had seen the Subcommittee recommendation on NSIA are convinced that it will get nowhere unless it is looked upon as a coordinating group not duplicating the responsibilities of existing departments and agencies. This he felt would hold true in time of war as well as in time of peace. Both he and Colonel Rich held a heated debate with Mr. Block, who contended that the organization envisaged by the SANACC Subcommittee was to be an independent operating agency. They contended that the organization the Subcommittee had in mind was "a coordinating agency like CIA."

7. I took the stand that since I had been a member of the Subcommittee I had never felt that we were thinking about a peacetime operation akin to the Central Intelligence Agency. I observed that the confusion in the Subcommittee discussion came from lack of definition as to what the individuals had in mind. Hence I reiterated what I have stated before that in peacetime our Congress will not give funds for a psychological warfare agency, and hence, for national security. [redacted]

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[redacted] In time of war, however, the chairman of this planning group will be given strength to coordinate the whole function and will gather unto himself an organization only those operations which cannot be adequately and efficiently performed by existing agencies of Government. For proper coordination he will require representatives from the agencies which fall within his realm of coordinating responsibility.

8. Mr. Block asked Commander Knoll to bring in a paper on this subject. Commander Knoll stated that he would officially report the discussion to the Navy Department and that the Navy may request SANACC to clarify 304/6. This whole subject was again discussed between Commander Knoll, Colonel Rich and myself after the meeting broke up.

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They were both in full agreement with my ideas and, from what they stated, it is apparent that they are in close touch with what is happening at the National Security Council level.

9. The Service members then discussed the need for training today of individuals for Special Operations and one of them suggested that such a function be placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commissioner Kroll stated that the training should be done in each agency responsible for carrying out S. O. activities. I observed that for proper operation and adequate security, the number of such agencies having responsibility for S. O. should be very limited. They all heartily agreed with this viewpoint.

10. By this time Mr. Block was totally lost as to where the Subcommittee was going in its discussions and he was most frank in making an observation to this effect. Recognizing that differences of opinion had arisen from the interpretation of 304/6, it was agreed to take this item up again at the next meeting of the Subcommittee and attempt to evolve a satisfactory answer.

[redacted]

ICAPS, MEMBER

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U. S. NATIONAL POLICY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

MEMORANDUM BY U.S. NAVY MEMBER

PROBLEM

To determine a sound U. S. National Policy on Psychological Warfare.

FACTS

The Charter of the Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluation designates responsibility for preparation of policies by this subcommittee.

A short clear statement of U. S. policy has not been emanated by the U. S. Government.

CONCLUSIONS

A statement of policy on Psychological Warfare will facilitate planning by the Subcommittee and advise government departments, activities and agencies that the United States recognizes psychological warfare as a valuable, comprehensive, powerful weapon in the national arsenal.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended:

- a. that the Subcommittee consider Enclosure (draft) - "U. S. National Policy on Psychological Warfare".
- b. that the U. S. definition of Psychological Warfare, as a part of a wartime weapon, be amended to conform with the U. K. definition - that it is applicable to peace, emergency or war.
- c. that the policy as developed by the Subcommittee, be referred to the SANACC for approval, and subsequently forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council for information.

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ENCLOSURE

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U. S. NATIONAL POLICY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

POLICY

To maintain a thoroughly integrated national psychological warfare agency with sufficient strength and readiness for national employment of psychological warfare, in conjunction with the Departments of the National Military Establishment, the Department of State, and other government departments, activities, and agencies; in support of U.S. national policies and interests.

Definition of Psychological Warfare

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Psychological Warfare is defined as:-

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The planned use, during time of war, of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims, with the following objectives:-

- a. To assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight;
- b. To sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy;
- c. To improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitude of neutral countries toward the United States.

